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254 Abstract
The goals of this article were to determine whether the efﬁ  ciency of tax authorities 
in Croatia improved over the period 1997-2012 and to identify how their efﬁ  -
ciency can be improved in the future. According to our research the administrative 
costs of taxation in Croatia, as a percentage of GDP, decreased slightly over the 
past ﬁ  fteen years but still remain above the EU average. Thus, there is a need to 
reduce the administrative costs of taxation, ﬁ  rst by identifying and abolishing 
nuisance taxes that raise very little revenue and have high administrative costs. 
Second, special attention should be devoted to analysing and reducing the service 
expenses of tax authorities (especially IT expenses and expenses for telephone, 
mail and transportation services). The main problem related to research into ad-
ministrative costs in Croatia over a longer period is the lack of relevant and relia-
ble data, and hence the Croatian tax authorities should collect more data and re-
lease them to the public.
Keywords: administrative costs, taxation, Croatia
1 INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
The process of collecting taxes is far from cost-free. Indeed, the process involves 
certain costs that the literature typically divides into administrative costs (ACs) 
and compliance costs (CCs) (see, for example, Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick, 
1989). This paper focuses on ACs, which include public-sector costs related to the 
enforcement (administration) of existing tax legislation, including proposals for 
changes to that legislation that are proposed by the relevant public revenue collec-
tion authorities (for additional information, see Sandford, 1995; Sandford et al., 
1995; and Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick, 1989:3). A practical deﬁ  nition of 
ACs is also provided in Allers (1994:33), who describes ACs as public-sector 
costs that either would not exist in the absence of a tax or would disappear if a 
particular tax were abolished.
There has been widespread research into this topic worldwide.1 Based on an anal-
ysis of 60 studies on ACs and CCs since 1980, Evans (2003) concludes that in 
countries where ACs have been explored, the costs rarely exceed 1% of the tax 
revenues that are collected by the administration; further, ACs impose a smaller 
burden (in both absolute and relative terms) than do CCs (for additional details, 
see Evans, 2003:72). The most prominent organisation that explores ACs is the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which has 
released ﬁ  ve publications with internationally comparable data on the tax systems 
and tax administrations of 52 countries (i.e., all of the OECD, EU and G20 coun-
tries) (OECD, 2004; 2006; 2009; 2011 and 2013). According to the most recent 
OECD publication (2013), there are stark differences in AC-to-GDP ratios among 
the observed countries during the period 2004-2011; however, in one-third of 
1 For example, see Sandford, Godwin and Hardwick (1989); Sandford et al. (1995); Evans, Pope and Hassel-
dine (2001); Lignier and Evans (2012); and OECD (2004, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013).M
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255 those countries, the ratio ranged between 0.15% and 0.25%. A relatively low share 
of ACs in GDP (below 0.12%) is primarily observed in countries with low tax 
burdens and those where major taxes are not always administered by the national 
government (e.g., Chile, Estonia, Mexico and the USA). A continuous downward 
trend in this ratio is observed in a small number of countries, including Australia, 
Denmark, France, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia 
and the UK, but no explanation is offered as to the cause of this phenomenon.
In Croatia, the issue of ACs was ﬁ  rst explored by Ott and Bajo (2000), who found 
that in the ﬁ  ve-year period between 1995 and 1999, ACs accounted for approxi-
mately 0.55% of GDP; given their size, these costs left substantial room for savings. 
The authors emphasised the importance of determining the ACs for each type of tax; 
however, they argued that this determination was impossible because there was no 
record of ACs by type of tax, and the allocation of overhead (general costs) to indi-
vidual tax types posed a particular problem. Bratić and Pitarević (2004) found that 
ACs continued to account for an average of 0.55% of GDP during the period 1997-
2001, but the accuracy and relevance of the data (which were difﬁ  cult to access) 
pose a serious challenge for research.2 Blažić (2004) demonstrated that the total 
taxation costs in Croatia accounted for 3.13% of GDP from June 2001 to June 2002, 
of which ACs and CCs accounted for 0.47% and 2.66% of GDP, respectively. More 
recently, Bratić and Šimović (2010) analysed the cost efﬁ  ciency of tax authorities in 
Croatia during the period 2000-2007 in comparison with OECD member countries. 
They concluded that the Croatian Tax Administration (TA), Customs Administra-
tion (CA) and Financial Police (FP) have the worst cost efﬁ  ciency.
The goals of this article were to determine whether the efﬁ  ciency of tax authorities 
in Croatia improved over the period 1997-2012 and to identify how their efﬁ  -
ciency can be improved in the future. We argue, however, that a primary problem 
is a lack of information relevant to the examination of ACs in Croatia over a 
longer period of time. As a percentage of GDP, the total ACs of taxation in Croatia 
have fallen slightly over the past ﬁ  fteen years but remain above the average for 
EU member states. The OECD (2013:178) indicates that the efﬁ  ciency/effective-
ness of tax authorities is typically assessed as the “cost-to-collection” ratio (calcu-
lated as the percentage share of ACs in the revenues that are collected by a coun-
try’s tax administration). Assuming other variables remain constant, a decline in 
this indicator over time suggests a fall in relative costs (i.e., an efﬁ  ciency improve-
ment) and/or a rise in collected revenues (i.e., an effectiveness improvement). 
However, according to the OECD (2013), this indicator should be interpreted with 
caution, as several factors that are unconnected with tax authorities’ efﬁ  ciency/ef-
fectiveness can affect it. Other authors also emphasise the need for caution in 
cross-country comparisons of ACs using the “cost-to-collection” ratio (see Sand-
2 Researchers in other transitional countries have also faced both data unavailability and poor data quality when 
conducting their analyses. For example, in exploring ACs in the Czech Republic, Vitek and Pubal (2002) argue that 
data are only available at the aggregate level, which is often inadequate for calculating ACs and CCs for particular 
types of taxes.M
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256 ford, 1995:405; Sandford, 2000 and Evans, 2006). For example, Sandford 
(2000:119-123) notes that cross-country comparisons based on the “cost-to-col-
lection” ratio are difﬁ  cult for the following reasons:
Data collection does not typically employ a standardised methodology in the 
different countries, as there are differences in how ACs are deﬁ  ned and in the 
types of revenues that are collected by tax authorities; for example, certain 
tax authorities collect social contributions and customs duties, whereas oth-
ers do not.
A country’s demographic, political, social, economic and legal circumsta-
nces can have a strong inﬂ  uence on the “cost-to-collection” ratio because of 
the following:
differences in the tax structure (e.g., the value added tax (VAT) registration 
threshold is low in some countries but high in others, and collecting taxes 
from a large number of small taxpayers results in high ACs);
differences in the taxpayer structure (e.g., the larger the number of self-em-
ployed taxpayers, the higher the ACs);
differences in tax rates (e.g., countries with large total tax revenues as a 
percentage of GDP have heavy tax burdens and are associated with lower 
“cost-to-collection” ratios than countries with similar taxes but lower tax 
burdens);
changes in revenues that are not associated with changes in tax rates (e.g., 
unusual economic growth rates or inﬂ  ation); and
several other factors that can inﬂ  uence the ratio, such as the introduction 
of new taxes.
Both Sandford (2000:123) and the OECD (2013) point out that the potential maxi-
mum tax revenues that can be collected by tax authorities are an extremely impor-
tant factor, especially in international comparisons. Thus, countries with similar 
“cost-to-collection” ratios can be completely different with respect to efﬁ  ciency, 
which is measured as the ratio between collected and potential maximum tax rev-
enues.
The OECD (2013:179-182) notes that the ratio between costs and GDP (calcu-
lated as the percentage share of ACs in GDP) might be more appropriate for inter-
national comparisons. However, this indicator should also be employed with cau-
tion, as several factors that are unrelated to tax authorities’ efﬁ  ciency can inﬂ  u-
ence the ratio between costs and GDP (e.g., large investments in new technologies, 
costs arising from a new tax or frequent GDP revisions).
Despite all these deﬁ  ciencies, ACs are calculated and compared to establish dif-
ferences among countries. These differences, to the extent that they can be associ-
ated with the efﬁ  ciency of tax administrations, are then analysed and explored for 
each individual country (Sandford, 2000:137). Therefore, we explain the research 
methodology for ACs in Croatia, and then we compare ACs between Croatia and 
the EU. Finally, we present conclusions on how to improve the efﬁ  ciency of the 
Croatian tax authorities.
–
–
–
–
–
–
–M
I
H
A
E
L
A
 
B
R
O
N
I
Ć
,
 
V
J
E
K
O
S
L
A
V
 
B
R
A
T
I
Ć
:
C
A
N
 
T
H
E
 
E
F
F
I
C
I
E
N
C
Y
 
O
F
 
T
H
E
 
C
R
O
A
T
I
A
N
 
T
A
X
 
A
U
T
H
O
R
I
T
I
E
S
 
B
E
 
I
M
P
R
O
V
E
D
?
F
I
N
A
N
C
I
A
L
 
T
H
E
O
R
Y
 
A
N
D
 
P
R
A
C
T
I
C
E
3
8
 
(
3
)
 
2
5
3
-
2
7
5
 
(
2
0
1
4
)
257 2 METHODOLOGY AND DATA
As noted above, ACs in Croatia include the costs of three institutions that are re-
sponsible for collecting taxes and customs duties: the TA, CA and FP.3 ACs are pri-
marily ﬁ  nanced from the state budget and, to a lesser extent, from these three institu-
tions’ own revenues. Ott and Bajo (2000) note that for a more complete analysis of 
Croatia’s ACs, the total ACs should also include the costs of the institution that actu-
ally collects and maintains records of tax and customs duties; before 2001, this in-
stitution was the Payment Operations Institute, and since 2002, the institution has 
been the Financial Agency (FINA). Ott and Bajo (2000) also suggest including the 
costs of the courts that decide tax and customs cases in the analysis.4
Regrettably, data on the costs of FINA and the courts could not be obtained, as they 
are not publicly available. A request for access to the information ﬁ  led with the 
Ministry of Justice and FINA was unsuccessful because (1) they responded that they 
were not in possession of the requested data; or (2) they promised to submit the data 
at a later date (but never did). According to FINA reports, its Treasury System Sup-
port Centre performs certain activities on behalf of the TA on a contract basis, but 
the centre invoices the Ministry of Finance (MF) instead of the TA5 for those serv-
ices. Therefore, the services that FINA provides on behalf of the TA and the costs of 
these services should be further investigated, as they are not produced by the TA but 
should be included in the ACs. However, these costs are currently reported within 
the MF’s budget and are not clearly separated from other costs.
Sandford (2000:117) and Evans (2006:2-3) detail additional costs that should be 
included in the ACs, such as parliamentary costs related to the enactment of tax 
legislation. Although the costs mentioned by Sandford and Evans are not ad-
dressed in this research, future explorations of these costs in the Croatian context 
would be useful.
3 The FP existed from 28 December 1992 to 31 December 2001 before being abolished. The FP did not operate   
from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2005, and the Agency was reinstituted from 1 January 2006 to 6 March 
2012 before being abolished again. The work of the FP was regulated by the Financial Police Law (in Croatian 
Zakon o financijskoj policiji). According to that Law (NN 177/04, 55/11 and 25/12), the FP performed finan-
cial monitoring of the legality, regularity and timeliness of accounting, registration and payment of budget 
revenues and fees prescribed by particular laws (especially those regarding excise taxes, social security con-
tributions, concession and lease agreements). 
According to the Customs Service Act (in Croatian Zakon o carinskoj službi, until 2001 NN 53/91 and 106/93, 
in the period from 2001 to 2009 NN 67/01, in the period from 2009 to 2013 NN 83/09, 49/11 and 34/12, and 
from 2013 NN 68/13 and 30/14) the most important tasks of the CA is that it is responsible for the assess-
ment and collection of customs duties, VAT and other mandatory public charges at the import and export of 
goods and implements customs control measures, including verifying the facts relevant to the taxation or cus-
toms clearance of goods.
4 The costs of courts imply the costs of administrative courts that are the first to adjudicate individual tax 
and customs disputes (in Zagreb, Split, Rijeka and Osijek) and the costs of the High Administrative Court in 
Zagreb, which is the second to adjudicate these disputes (on appeals of first-instance decisions). The Gen  eral 
Tax Act prescribes legal remedies in tax proceedings (Articles 159 through 171 of the Opći porezni zakon, 
NN 147/08, 18/11, 78/12, 136/12 and 73/13).
5 FINA performs the following revenue-related activities, the analytical records of which are maintained by the 
TA: (1) supporting the system of recording and assigning public revenues, and (2) conducting other activities 
on behalf of the TA, such as assessment activities, recording, supervision, collection and enforcement of cer-
tain local revenues on behalf of the local government units (for additional information, see FINA, 2012).M
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258 This article uses reports from the MF, TA and CA.6 According to the economic 
classiﬁ  cation followed in Croatia’s state budget, ACs include operational costs/
expenses (e.g., for employees, spent materials and IT services) and costs/expenses 
for the procurement of capital assets (e.g., buildings and ofﬁ  ce equipment). How-
ever, these reports are often inadequate to perform the necessary analyses. Thus, 
determining the ACs for each tax is impossible because the costs are not moni-
tored according to the type of tax. Moreover, it would be interesting to determine 
the speciﬁ  c amounts of tax revenues collected by the TA and the CA, but this was 
impossible in this study because we lacked data on the amount of the VAT on 
imports that is collected by the CA.
Nonetheless, this is the ﬁ  rst study on Croatia in which the collection costs of social 
contributions are included in the ACs for 2001 and 2002. Until 2001, social contri-
butions were collected by separate institutions (i.e., the Croatian Pension Insurance 
Institute, the Croatian Health Insurance Institute and the Croatian Employment 
Service), which had the status of extra-budgetary funds. The costs of these institu-
tions (and revenues from social contributions) were not reported in the state budget. 
Researchers have been unable to include the costs that are generated by these insti-
tutions in the ACs, as the available data did not clearly indicate what share of these 
costs are related to the collection of social contributions versus the payment of 
various beneﬁ  ts (e.g., pensions, sickness beneﬁ  ts and health protection). Thus, pre-
vious studies did not include the costs of these institutions in the total ACs, and for 
the same reason, the revenues from social contributions collected were not includ-
ed in the total revenues that are collected by tax authorities.7
Although the TA performed certain activities related to social contributions8 even 
before 2001, in July 2001, the TA became responsible for all of Croatia’s opera-
tions related to social contributions, including the assessment, record-keeping, 
collection, supervision and enforcement of contributions, as well as the manage-
ment of misdemeanour proceedings (Zakon o Poreznoj upravi, NN 67/01). Con-
sequently, the TA budget (and thus the ACs) has included costs related to pension-
insurance contributions since 1 July 2001 and unemployment and health insurance 
contributions since 1 January 2002. Moreover, at the same time, revenues from 
social contributions are included in the total revenues that are collected by tax 
authorities.
6 This article considers Annual reports on the execution of the state budget of the Republic of Croatia for the 
period 2000-2012 (Ministry of Finance, 2000-2012); information on TA expenditures in relation to the finan-
cial plan for the period 1995-2006 (Tax Administration, 1995-2006); the Revenue and expenditure statements, 
receipts and outlays of the TA for the period 2002-2012 (Tax Administration, 2002-2012); Reports on the 
number of employees, total annual revenues and total annual costs of the CA for the period 1997-2012 (Cus-
toms Administration, 1997-2012); and the Revenue and expenditure statements, receipts and outlays of the CA 
for the period 2005-2012 (Customs Administration, 2005-2012). These sources are not always reliable, i.e., 
the numbers for the same types of data occasionally differed across different reports, especially for the period 
before 2004, and hence the authors were forced to choose which numbers to include in the analysis.
7 However, because of the inclusion of costs related to social contributions in our study, the total ACs during 
the periods before and after 2001/2002 are not fully comparable.
8 One example is the supervision of the correctness and timeliness of the calculation and payment of contri-
butions (see the Opći porezni zakon, NN 71/99).M
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259 The analysis of key indicators of the Croatian tax authorities’ (in)efﬁ  ciency com-
pared to the average indicators for EU member states is presented below. Then, we 
suggest costs that the Croatian tax authorities could reduce.
3   ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS IN CROATIA 
IN THE PERIOD 1997-2012
As depicted in ﬁ  gure 1, the total ACs in Croatia declined by approximately 10% 
in 2012 from 1997 (from 0.48% to 0.44% of GDP). The largest AC-to-GDP ratio 
was recorded in 1999 (0.58%).
The sharpest declines in ACs were observed in 2000 and 2001, when a rise in GDP 
coincided with a decline in ACs in absolute terms. From 2005 to 2010, the AC-to-
GDP ratio again increased but fell slightly after 2010 as the economic situation in 
Croatia deteriorated. As a result, in 2012, Croatia spent 0.44% of its GDP on ad-
ministering tax and customs legislation. To establish whether the total ACs in 
Croatia are high, we compare them with the EU average, despite all of the con-
straints and deﬁ  ciencies (i.e., differences in methodology).
As plotted in ﬁ  gure 2, Croatia’s ACs exceeded the EU average9 in the period 2005-
2011. Annex 1 features ACs as percentages of GDP for individual EU member 
states in the period 2005-2012. The AC data for the period before 2005 were not 
available for all EU member states, and the available data for the period after 2005 
do not clearly detail the actual composition of ACs for each country. Interestingly, 
in 2007, Croatia’s ACs were near the EU average, but they increased after 2007 
9 Note that the number of EU member states changed during that period, as Bulgaria and Romania joined the 
EU in 2007. 
TACs: Tax Administration costs; CACs: Customs Administration costs; FPACs: Financial Police 
Administration costs.
Source: Ministry of Finance (2000-2012); Tax Administration (1995-2006; 2002-2012); Customs 
Administration (1997-2012; 2005-2012).
FIGURE 1
ACs in Croatia, as a percentage of GDP, 1997-2012M
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* For the purposes of this analysis, “collected tax revenues” are the tax revenues of the state budget.
Sources: Ministry of Finance (2000-2012); Tax Administration (1995-2006; 2002-2012); Customs 
Administration (1997-2012; 2005-2012).
FIGURE 3
ACs in Croatia as percentage of collected tax revenues, 1997-2012*
Sources: OECD (2013); Ministry of Finance (2000-2012); Tax Administration (1995-2006; 2002-
2012); Customs Administration (1997-2012; 2005-2012).
FIGURE 2
A comparison of ACs between Croatia and the EU, as a percentage of GDP, 
2005-2011
(to 0.46% of GDP in 2011), while the EU’s average ACs fell markedly (to 0.23% 
of GDP in 2011).
The percentage share of ACs in Croatia’s total tax and customs revenues declined 
sharply in 2001 and 2002 (from 2.16% in 2000 to 1.14% in 2002, see ﬁ  gure 3).10 
10 State budget non-tax revenues (such as property income, various administrative fees, and penalties) are not 
included into revenues collected by TA, CA and FP because we did not have information how much TA, CA
and FP participate in administration of these revenues. This should be investigated in future studies. Addition-
ally, because the TA collects taxes on behalf of some local government units, charging a fee in the amount of 
5% of collected tax revenues, we wish to know the number of local government units for which the TA collects   
taxes in order to find out how much of these taxes should be included into revenues collected by TA. However,   
the TA has not responded to this inquiry, and this also remains to be investigated in future.M
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261 Speciﬁ  cally, the cost of collecting 100 kuna in tax and customs revenues in 2002 
was 1.14 kuna. The most important cause of the declines in ACs as percentage of 
collected revenues in 2001 and 2002 was the previously explained inclusion of 
social contributions in collected tax revenues. Social contributions constitute the 
second most abundant source of tax revenues after VAT. In the period 2000-2012, 
social contributions accounted for approximately 34% of total tax revenues at the 
general government level (see annex 2). Additionally, GDP increased during this 
period, ACs decreased in absolute terms and the FP was abolished. After 2002, 
ACs increased slightly, reaching 1.4% of collected tax revenues in 2012.
From the previous ﬁ  gures, it is possible to conclude that ACs in Croatia should be 
reviewed and if possible reduced. Thus, ﬁ  rst, there is a need to identify and review 
“nuisance” taxes that raise very little revenue (and may have high administrative 
and compliance costs as in other countries (see Chittenden, Foster, and Sloan, 
2010:159)). It might be more effective if some of these “nuisance” taxes were 
entirely eliminated. Although there is a need for detailed analysis, at ﬁ  rst glance it 
appears that in Croatia some of following taxes might be strong candidates for 
“nuisance” taxes: certain property taxes (e.g., the public land use tax or second 
home tax), consumption taxes, excluding the VAT and excise taxes (e.g., trading 
name tax), and/or certain other small taxes (see annex 2). In other words, the “nui-
sance” taxes should be ﬁ  rst step of an investigation of ACs. Figure 4 compares 
Croatian ACs as percentage of collected revenues with the EU average.
In 2005, ACs in Croatia accounted for approximately 1.2% of collected revenues, 
which was nearly equal to the EU average. However, a reversal of this trend oc-
curred after 2005, when ACs in Croatia steadily increased to approximately 1.5% 
of collected revenues in 2011. Moreover, the average EU ACs decreased to 1.1% 
Sources: OECD (2013); Ministry of Finance (2000-2012); Tax Administration (1995-2006; 2002-
2012); Customs Administration (1997-2012; 2005-2012).
FIGURE 4
ACs in Croatia and the EU, as a percentage of collected revenues, 2005-2011M
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262 of collected revenues in 2011. Thus why the Croatian tax authorities appear to be 
inefﬁ  cient relative to the EU average remains an open question, and hence we 
examine the structure of ACs in Croatia in greater detail below.
From 1997 to 2012, total ACs more than doubled in absolute terms (from ap-
proximately 700 million kuna to slightly more than 1.4 billion kuna). From 1997 
to 2009, TACs and CACs generally increased in absolute terms, with the excep-
tion of the years 2000, 2001 and 2002. TACs and CACs declined slightly after 
2009 (ﬁ  gure 5). In the period 2004-2012, total ACs rose by approximately 60% 
(from 886 million kuna to approximately 1.4 billion kuna). For the entire period 
1997-2012, TACs accounted for 50-60% of the total ACs, while the remaining 
ACs were primarily CACs (while the Financial Police Administration’s costs 
(FPACs) were almost negligible).
An analysis of ﬁ  nancial statements for the period 2004-2012 reveals that the larg-
est expenses were recorded for staff and service expenses and accounted for the 
bulk of the total ACs (approximately 90% – table 1).
As table 2 indicates, staff and service expenses increased steadily over the ob-
served period (staff expenses increased by 46%, from 631 million kuna to 921 
million kuna, and service expenses increased by more than 330%, from 96 million 
kuna to 420 million kuna). Therefore, a detailed analysis of staff and service ex-
penses is presented below.
For the EU countries, only data on salary expenses were available. According to the 
available data, in the period 2005-2011, the share of salary expenses in ACs in 
TACs: Tax Administration costs; CACs: Customs Administration costs; FPACs: Financial Police 
Administration costs.
Sources: Ministry of Finance (2000-2012); Tax Administration (1995-2006; 2002-2012); Customs 
Administration (1997-2012; 2005-2012).
FIGURE 5
ACs by institution, in million kuna, 1997-2012M
I
H
A
E
L
A
 
B
R
O
N
I
Ć
,
 
V
J
E
K
O
S
L
A
V
 
B
R
A
T
I
Ć
:
C
A
N
 
T
H
E
 
E
F
F
I
C
I
E
N
C
Y
 
O
F
 
T
H
E
 
C
R
O
A
T
I
A
N
 
T
A
X
 
A
U
T
H
O
R
I
T
I
E
S
 
B
E
 
I
M
P
R
O
V
E
D
?
F
I
N
A
N
C
I
A
L
 
T
H
E
O
R
Y
 
A
N
D
 
P
R
A
C
T
I
C
E
3
8
 
(
3
)
 
2
5
3
-
2
7
5
 
(
2
0
1
4
)
263 Croatia11 was below the average of the EU member states. In the period 2005-2011, 
the EU average was approximately 70% of the total ACs. In a review of previous 
studies, Sandford (2000:118) reports that staff expenses represent the largest costs 
and typically account for approximately three-quarters of the total ACs.
From table 3, it is clear that particular attention should be devoted to analysing IT 
services expenses, as they increased from approximately 3% to 51% of total serv-
ice expenses in the period from 2004 to 2012. It is interesting that these IT serv-
ices expenses are only related to maintenance and support for existing software 
and not to purchasing new software/hardware.
As shown in table 4, of service expenses, expenses for IT services grew the most 
rapidly (by more than 7,000%, from approximately 3 million kuna to 214 million 
11 Salary expenses in Croatia only include salaries and social security contributions. Other staff expenses are 
not included (e.g., fieldwork and separation allowances).
TABLE 1
ACs as a percentage of total administrative costs, 2004-2012.*
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Average 
2004-12
Staff  expenses  80  72  74  67  66  63  64  64  64 68
Material and 
energy expenses
  4   5   5   4   4   4   4   4   4  4
Service  expenses  12  18  16  23  25  29  27  27  29 23
Other current 
expenses
  0   1   0   1   0   0   0   0   0  0
Capital  expenses   3   5   5   6   5   5   5   5   3  5
Total ACs 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   –
* Only ACs financed from the state budget are analysed. Smaller amounts of ACs financed from 
TA, CA and FP own revenues are not analysed due to a lack of detailed data.
Source: Ministry of Finance (2000-2012).
TABLE 2
ACs, in million kuna, 2004-2012*
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2012/2004 
(change 
in %)
Staff  expenses 631 668    775    898    971    975    971    966    921  46
Material and 
energy expenses
 36  43     48     51     55     56     57     54     57  60
Service  expenses  96 165    167    316    369    446    410    409    420 336
Other current 
expenses
  3   5      4      7      6      4      5      4      4  1 4
Capital  expenses  26  43     55     78     70     78     73     75     38  42
Total  AC 793 924 1,049 1,351 1,472 1,560 1,516 1,508 1,439   –
* Only ACs financed from the state budget are analysed. Smaller amounts of ACs financed from 
TA, CA and FP own revenues are not analysed due to a lack of detailed data.
Source: Ministry of Finance (2000-2012).M
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264 kuna). Leasing and rental expenses also increased sharply (by more than 300%, 
from 7 million kuna to 30 million kuna), as did intellectual and personal-service 
expenses (by approximately 800%, from 2 million kuna to 21 million kuna). 
  Expenses for telephone, mail and transportation services were also high in abso-
lute terms during the observed period, as they constituted an average of approxi-
mately 90 million kuna annually. Consequently, both the TA and CA should ana-
lyse the mentioned expenses in detail and examine whether and to what extent 
these expenses should be reduced.
TABLE 3
Service expenses, 2004-2012, as a percentage of total service expenses*
Expenses 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Average 
2004-12
Telephone, mail and 
transportation services
 50  61  46  27  25  27  24  21  18 33
Current and investment 
maintenance services
 1 1   8  1 3   9   8   7  1 1   3   7  9
Utility  services  16  13  12   7   7   6   7   2   2  8
Leases  and  rentals   7   6   8   6   5   4   6   7   7  6
Intellectual and 
personal services
  2  2  3  4  7 1 7  8  4  5  6
IT  services   3   3   3  37  40  34  38  52  51 29
Other  services  11   8  15  10   7   5   6  11  10  9
Total service expenses 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100   –
* Only ACs financed from the state budget are analysed. Smaller amounts of ACs financed from 
TA, CA and FP own revenues are not analysed due to a lack of detailed data.
Source: Ministry of Finance (2000-2012).
* For Croatia, only ACs financed from the state budget are analysed. Smaller amounts of ACs 
financed from TA, CA and FP own revenues are not analysed due to a lack of detailed data.
Sources: OECD (2013); Ministry of Finance (2000-2012); Tax Administration (1995-2006; 2002-
2012); Customs Administration (1997-2012; 2005-2012).
FIGURE 6 
Salary expenses in Croatia and the EU, percentage of ACs, 1997-2011*M
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265 TABLE 4
Service expenses, in million kuna, 2004-2012*
Expenses 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
2012/2004 
(change in %)
Telephone, mail and 
transportation services
48 101  77  85  93 119 100  84  76     57
Current and investment 
maintenance services
10  13  21  28  31  31  45  13  28    166
Utility  services 15  21  21  23  26  28  28   9   9      -44
Leases  and  rentals  7   9  14  18  19  19  24  29  29    323
Intellectual and 
personal services
 2   3   5  13  26  77  34  17  21    841
IT  services  3   5   5 116 149 149 156 214 214 7,455
Other  services 10  13  25  33  26  22  24  43  43    326
Total service expenses 96 165 167 316 369 446 410 409 420       –
* Only ACs financed from the state budget are analysed. Smaller amounts of ACs financed from 
TA, CA and FP own revenues are not analysed due to a lack of detailed data.
Source: Ministry of Finance (2000-2012).
Finally, it would be interesting to examine whether increases/decreases in ACs are 
related to tax legislation changes in Croatia; one could determine whether the total 
ACs rose during the years in which the most radical changes in the national tax 
system occurred. One can assume that every change in tax law leads to a rise in ACs, 
as there is, for example, a need for new employees to manage a more complex sys-
tem. Annex 3 reports major changes in the most important types of taxes (the per-
sonal income tax, corporate income tax, VAT and social contributions) in Croatia in 
the period 1997-2012. However, as changes in tax legislation are frequent in Croatia 
(tax rates and/or tax bases are changed nearly annually), it would be hig  hly difﬁ  cult 
to establish any causality between tax legislation changes and changes in total ACs.12 
Thus, the need to collect cost data by type of tax should be strongly emphasised.
12 The year 1999 is perhaps an exception, as ACs rose markedly after one of the most radical tax changes 
(which occurred in 1998) – the introduction of the VAT.
FIGURE 7
ACs and GDP developments in Croatia, 1997-2012
Source: Ministry of Finance (2000-2012).M
I
H
A
E
L
A
 
B
R
O
N
I
Ć
,
 
V
J
E
K
O
S
L
A
V
 
B
R
A
T
I
Ć
:
C
A
N
 
T
H
E
 
E
F
F
I
C
I
E
N
C
Y
 
O
F
 
T
H
E
 
C
R
O
A
T
I
A
N
 
T
A
X
 
A
U
T
H
O
R
I
T
I
E
S
 
B
E
 
I
M
P
R
O
V
E
D
?
F
I
N
A
N
C
I
A
L
 
T
H
E
O
R
Y
 
A
N
D
 
P
R
A
C
T
I
C
E
3
8
 
(
3
)
 
2
5
3
-
2
7
5
 
(
2
0
1
4
)
266 Figure 7 suggests that the increase in ACs in Croatia during the period 2002-2012 
could be related to economic growth (GDP movements); the TA, CA and FP sim-
ply have higher expenditures during periods of economic growth, whereas they 
spend less during economic downturns. More analysis is needed to explain this 
relationship, but the previous tables and ﬁ  gures suggest that one of the reasons is 
that during the periods of economic growth, in addition to staff expenses, the costs 
for IT services increased dramatically (costs related to maintenance and support 
for existing software).
4 CONCLUSIONS
The goals of this article were to determine whether the efﬁ  ciency of the Croatian 
tax authorities improved over the period 1997-2012 and to identify how their ef-
ﬁ  ciency can be improved in the future. The key indicator of the analysis (ACs as 
a percentage of GDP) declined during the observed period but remained above the 
EU member state average. Therefore, the TA and CA should intensify their efforts 
to reduce ACs. The tax authorities should seek to collect the maximum revenue at 
the minimum cost within the existing taxation framework (Sandford, Godwin and 
Hardwick, 1989:203). The ﬁ  rst action that the tax authorities could take is to iden-
tify and, if possible, abolish nuisance taxes that raise very little revenue and have 
high administrative costs. Second, there is a need for a thorough analysis of ACs 
to establish whether they can be reduced. According to the present analysis, staff 
expenses, IT expenses and expenses for telephone, mail and transportation serv-
ices represent the largest expenditure categories. Consequently, both the TA and 
CA should devote particular attention to analysing these expenses to determine 
whether and to what extent they can be reduced.
In the period 2002-2012, ACs in Croatia were primarily related to economic 
growth (GDP movements), as the expenditures of the TA, CA and FP are higher 
when the economy is strong and lower during economic downturns. During pe-
riods of economic growth, in addition to staff expenses, the costs for IT services 
increased dramatically (costs related to maintenance and support for existing soft-
ware).
As in previous studies (e.g., Ott and Bajo, 2000; Bratić and Pitarević, 2004; Vitek 
and Pubal, 2002), this research was constrained by the unavailability of public 
data. Due to inadequate data, ACs cannot be attributed to individual types of taxes, 
which is a situation that should be improved in the future. Such information would 
help the TA and CA to establish which taxes are the most expensive to administer 
and ﬁ  nd appropriate measures, if necessary and/or possible, to reduce the underly-
ing costs. To obtain a better picture of the total cost of collecting taxes and to be 
able to minimise them, in addition to researching administrative costs, it is also 
necessary to research the compliance costs of each tax because there is an element 
of transferability between administrative costs and compliance costs (as the gov-
ernment may assign the responsibilities for and costs of collecting taxes to tax-M
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267 payers instead on its own administration). Efforts should also be made to establish 
the costs that are generated by FINA, the institution that collects and maintains tax 
records on behalf of the TA and CA, the costs of courts that adjudicate tax and 
customs cases, and parliamentary costs related to enacting tax legislation.M
I
H
A
E
L
A
 
B
R
O
N
I
Ć
,
 
V
J
E
K
O
S
L
A
V
 
B
R
A
T
I
Ć
:
C
A
N
 
T
H
E
 
E
F
F
I
C
I
E
N
C
Y
 
O
F
 
T
H
E
 
C
R
O
A
T
I
A
N
 
T
A
X
 
A
U
T
H
O
R
I
T
I
E
S
 
B
E
 
I
M
P
R
O
V
E
D
?
F
I
N
A
N
C
I
A
L
 
T
H
E
O
R
Y
 
A
N
D
 
P
R
A
C
T
I
C
E
3
8
 
(
3
)
 
2
5
3
-
2
7
5
 
(
2
0
1
4
)
268
ANNEX 1
ACs in EU member states, as a percentage of GDP, 2005-2012
Administrative costs of tax administration/
gross domestic product, measured as a percentage* Signiﬁ  cant factors 
affecting cross-country 
comparisons of ratios 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Greece n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
Croatia 0.36 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.48 0.47 0.45
Tax Administration, 
Customs Administration, 
Financial Police
Hungary 0.30 0.33 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.42 0.38  
Malta n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.41 0.36  
Belgium 0.38 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.35  
Netherlands 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.33  
Slovenia n.a. n.a. 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29  
Germany 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.28  
Portugal 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.26  
Poland 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.27 0.25  
Cyprus** n.a. n.a. n.a 0.18 0.19 0.25 0.25  
Ireland 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.25 Costs include customs 
duties
United Kingdom n.a. n.a. 0.34 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.24  
EU average 0.28 0.27 0.40 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.23  
Romania n.a. n.a. 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.13 0.23  
France 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.23  
Bulgaria 0.33 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.23  
Latvia n.a. n.a. 0.35 0.36 0.34 0.29 0.23  
Luxembourg 0.25 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.22  
Finland 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.21  
Denmark 0.37 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.21 0.20  
Czech Republic 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20  
Slovakia 0.22 0.20 0.17 n.a. n.a. 0.18 0.18  
Italy** 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.17 Some major costs not 
included
Sweden 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 Costs exclude debt 
collection
Lithuania n.a. n.a. 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.17 0.16  
Austria n.a. n.a. 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.15  
Spain n.a. n.a. 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 Costs include customs 
duties
Estonia n.a. n.a. 3.69 1.91 1.86 1.82 0.11  
* GDP at market prices in millions of national currency units.
** Cyprus: The data were revised to correct errors that were detected in the original data. 
Payments made on behalf of the Inland Revenue Department and VAT by other government 
departments are not reflected in these specific years.
Italy: Calculations prior to 2009 are based on cost data that were provided for tax-related func-
tions of the revenue body (Agenzia Entrate), tax-related work of the separate tax police body 
(Guardia di Financia), and separate tax debt collection functions (Equitalia); data are not pro-
vided for subsequent years.
Source: OECD (2013).M
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ANNEX 3
Basic changes in personal income tax, corporate income tax, the VAT and social 
contributions, 1997-2012
 
Change
Tax bases Tax rates
1997
PIT – the PA increases from 700 to 800 kuna; 
PIT – rates of 25% and 35% are replaced 
by rates of 20% and 35%
– tax relief for CDWV is introduced
CIT – the general rate is increased from 
25% to 35%
1998 VAT is introduced (at the standard rate of 22%)
SOC.C – the total rate of the pension 
insurance contribution is reduced from 
25.5% to 21.5%; 
– the total rate of the health insurance 
contribution is increased from 14% to 
18%; 
– the child beneﬁ  t and water 
contributions are abolished
1999 PIT – PA increases to 1,000 kuna
VAT – a reduced (zero) rate is introduced 
for certain products 
2000
VAT – the list of products that are taxed at 
the reduced (zero) rate is expanded
SOC.C – the total pension insurance 
contribution rate is reduced from 21.5% 
to 19.5%; 
PIT – the PA increases to 1,250 kuna
– the total health insurance contribution 
rate is reduced from 18% to 16%
CIT – investment incentives are introduced  
2001
VAT – the list of products that are taxed 
at the reduced (zero) rate is expanded
PIT – rates of 20% and 35% are replaced 
by rates of 15%, 25% and 35%
PIT – four new types of tax relief are introduced 
(the employment incentive, education and 
training incentive, deduction of insurance 
premiums paid by taxpayers to domestic 
insurance companies and incentive for self-
employed individuals in ASSCs and in the City 
of Vukovar who determine their income as the 
difference between receipts and outlays on the 
basis of business books) CIT – the general rate is reduced to 20%
CIT – a tax on dividends for non-resident legal 
entities is introduced; 
– tax relief for ASSCs and investment incentives 
is changed; 
– incentives for the City of Vukovar, 
employment incentives and disabled persons’ 
incentives are introduced
2002
PIT – an incentive for HMAs is introduced
SOC.C – a special contribution for 
insurance against accidents at work 
and occupational diseases is introduced 
(0.47%)
CIT – incentives for HMAs are introducedM
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Change
Tax bases Tax rates
2003
PIT – the tax brackets are changed; 
PIT – rates of 15%, 25% and 35% are 
replaced by rates of 15%, 25%, 35% 
and 45%
– PA is increased to 1,500 kuna; 
– two new types of tax relief are introduced 
(the research and development incentive and 
health care and housing allowance)
CIT – an R&D incentive and education 
and professional development incentive 
are introduced
SOC.C – the total pension insurance 
contribution rate is increased from 
19.5% to 20%; 
– the total health insurance contribution 
rate is reduced from 16.47% to 15.5%
SOC.C – pension insurance contributions on 
salaries and health insurance contributions from 
salaries are abolished
 
2005
PIT – the tax brackets are changed; 
 
– the PA is increased to 1,600 kuna
CIT – the tax on dividends for non-resident 
legal entities is lifted; 
– tax relief for companies that are engaged in 
shipping activities is introduced
SOC.C – a special contribution for the 
employment of disabled persons is introduced
2006
VAT – the list of products that are taxed at 
the reduced (zero) rate is reduced 
VAT – the new reduced (10%) rate 
is introduced 
2007
VAT – the list of products that are taxed at 
the reduced (10%) rate is expanded
 
PIT – a new form of tax relief is introduced 
(a deduction from the lump-sum amount of 
tax on income from crafts and agriculture in 
the ASSCs, HMAs, City of Vukovar and islands 
of the ﬁ  rst group)
CIT – incentives for disabled persons 
and employment incentives 
are abolished; 
– three forms of tax relief are changed 
(the investment incentive, R&D incentive 
and education and professional development 
incentive)
2008 PIT – the PA is increased to 1,800 kuna  
2009  
VAT – the standard rate is increased 
to 23%
2010
PIT – the tax brackets are changed; a new form 
of tax relief is introduced (a voluntary pension 
insurance premium paid by employers on behalf 
of their employees)
PIT – rates of 15%, 25%, 35% 
and 45% are replaced by rates of 12%, 
25% and 40%M
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Change
Tax bases Tax rates
2011
PIT – two types of tax relief are abolished 
(insurance premiums paid by taxpayers to 
domestic insurance companies and the health 
care and housing allowance)
 
2012
VAT – the list of products that are taxed at the 
reduced (10%) rate is expanded
VAT – the standard rate is increased to 
25%
PIT – the PA is increased to 2,200 kuna; the tax 
brackets are changed
CIT – a tax on dividends and proﬁ  t shares 
of non-resident legal entities is introduced; 
– investment incentives are replaced by a similar 
type of relief (investment incentive and 
incentive for the promotion of investment 
environments)
 
SOC.C – the health insurance 
contribution rate is reduced from 15% 
to 13%
Abbreviations: ASSC – areas of special state concern; CDWV – Croatian Disabled Homeland 
War Veterans; CIT – corporate income tax; SOC.C – social contributions; HMA – hill and moun-
tain areas; PA – personal allowance (other than the personal allowance for pensioners); PIT – 
  personal income tax; VAT – value added tax.
Source: Zakon o porezu na dodanu vrijednost, Zakon o porezu na dobit, Zakon o porezu na 
do  hodak, Zakon o doprinosima.M
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